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INTRODUCING CRIMINAL LAW 
Stephen J. Morse* 
BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW. By Leo Katz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987. 
Pp. xii, 343. Cloth, $45; paper, $14.95. 
CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUC-
TION. By C.L. Ten. New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. 
i, 175. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $18.95. 
How should one think and write about criminal law? Leo Katz 
and C.L. Ten have written thoughtful, instructive, and interesting 
books about substantive criminal law that do not discuss one substan-
tive issue in common - Katz addresses primarily doctrinal puzzles, 
Ten addresses primarily general justifying theories. Nevertheless, the 
books have many similarities. Both authors take the world as they 
find it: neither suggests that there is anything fundamentally wrong 
with current law. Both virtually exclude from consideration the 
"crime problem" and the administration of criminal justice. Both are 
fond of and attempt to justify the usefulness of unusual or fanciful 
hypotheticals to make their points. Both demonstrate the value, in-
deed the necessity, of using theories and data from other disciplines, 
mostly analytic philosophy, to make coherent sense of Anglo-Ameri-
can criminal law. Together they offer an encompassing examination 
of present criminal law. 
I 
Bad Acts and Guilty Minds is an eloquent and entertaining romp 
through all the brain-teasing issues that delight criminal law teachers 
and scholars - conundrums, to use Katz's apt characterization. Katz 
explores the' act doctrine, mens rea, justification and excuse, causation, 
complicity, conspiracy, and, of course, impossible attempts. Each is 
introduced by an evocative, well-told fact situation that raises the is-
sue. Here. is just a small sample of the stories. How do we decide 
when breaking the law is desirable? To explore the justification of ne-
cessity, Katz places us in the south Atlantic in July, 1883, in the 
wrecked Mignonette's tiny dinghy. Tom Dudley, Edwin Stephens, Ed-
mund (Ned) Brooks, and Richard Parker spent almost three weeks 
* Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B. 
1966, Tufts College; J.D. 1970, Ph.D. 1973, Harvard University. - Ed. 
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adrift in the lifeboat, until the prostrate cabin boy, Parker, was killed 
by Dudley and eaten by the remaining three. Five days later, the 
others were rescued by the passing German barque, Moctezuma. 
Upon their safe return to England, Dudley and Stephens were tried for 
murder. 1 Or, how do we decide if the conduct of a person behaving 
under another's powerful suggestion should be considered that per-
son's act? To dramatize the act doctrine, Katz narrates gripping tales 
of a German woman and a Danish man who committed crimes while 
allegedly acting under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion pro-
duced by nefarious hypnotists (pp. 128-33). Or, how do we know 
what a person intends? To elucidate the meaning of the mens rea of 
intention, Katz transports us to the Sudan, whose courts grappled 
with murder cases in which defendants killed in the culturally explica-
ble but mistaken belief that their victims were ghosts, witches or ma-
rauding monkeys (pp. 165-69). Or, if a person has the required intent 
for a criminal offense and does everything he or she intends, but the 
crime cannot be committed because of a factual glitch, should the per-
son be guilty of attempt? To analyze impossible attempts, Katz cre-
ates a set of judicial opinions from a hypothetical jurisdiction, Wessex, 
in which the defendant, one Omeira, is charged with attempting to 
export illegally a proscribed work of art that Omeira believes is genu-
ine, but that turns out to be a fake and therefore was not included in 
the export ban. 2 
Katz revels in these stories and provides all the details necessary to 
make them futeresting. Following each story, Katz analyzes the doc-
trinal issue raised. He employs philosophical theories primarily, but 
where appropriate, he also draws on psychological and economic theo-
ries and data. Rather than considering the issues in light of the pur-
poses of the criminal law or the prerequisites for just punishment, 3 he 
focuses on clarifying the confusions produced by our intuitions about 
each specific doctrine. For example, Katz illuminates the discussion 
of impossible attempts with philosophical consideration of the nature 
of intentions, the vagueness of rules, and the role of luck, but he ada-
mantly refuses to choose between alternative rules with quite different 
1. Pp. 22-26, discussing The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). Katz tells 
the tale extremely well, but makes some uncharacteristic mistakes. He places the shipwreck 
16,000 miles from the closest land, p. 23, whereas the Mignonette sank about 680 miles from the 
nearest land and somewhat more than 2000 miles from the nearest land the crew conceivably 
could have reached in a small dinghy, given the prevailing winds and currents. Katz twice mis-
spells the name of the rescuing boat, giving it as the popular but erroneous Montezuma, rather 
than the correct Moctezuma. Pp. 23-24. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE CoM-
MON LAW 49, 70 (1984). 
2. Pp. 276-99. Here Katz has borrowed the methodology of Kadish, Schulhofer and Paul-
sen's famous casebook hypothetical, "The Case of Lady Eldon's French Lace." See S. KADISH, 
S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 604-10 (4th ed. 1983). 
3. David Richards makes the same point about Bad Acts and Guilty Minds in a recent re-
view. See Richards, Book Review, 99 ETHICS 648, 649 (1989). 
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criminal justice consequences.4 He sprinkles more general jurispru-
dential discussions throughout,5 again elucidated by philosophy, but 
doctrinal conundrums remain his central focus. 
Katz hopes that his arguments and explanations will convince, but 
if not, he at least wants the stories to entice, intrigue, and give plea-
sure. 6 He succeeds with the latter tasks. To use a term much-favored 
by my daughter when she was younger, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds is 
surely the "funnest" survey of criminal law available. And if Katz 
sometimes fails with the former, it is not terribly important. 
Whereas Katz starts with stories, Ten begins with theories. Crime, 
Guilt, and Punishment, as its subtitle suggests, aims to be a philosophi-
cal introduction to crime and punishment, and so it is. Ten economi-
cally, lucidly, and sympathetically describes and criticizes all the 
major Anglo-American contenders for an adequate theory of punish-
ment. Consequently, the first two-thirds of the book contain chapters 
on various approaches to utilitarian and retributive justifications for 
criminal prohibitions and punishment, 7 on mixed theories (in the 
course of which Ten offers his own variant) (pp. 79-81), and on the 
theory of excuses. Hypothetical situations are employed, but only in 
the service of a previously established conceptual framework. I know 
of no better or more sophisticated brief introduction to these issues. 
The last third of the book uses the theoretical approaches of the earlier 
chapters to address, still rather abstractly, the more "practical" ques-
tions of the mentally disordered offender and the proper amount of 
punishment for convicted offenders. This part of the book, too, clari-
fies the issues by demonstrating that sensible analysis of nitty-gritty 
issues cannot avoid theory without lapsing into inconsistency or 
incoherence. 
II 
Readers searching for a stringent critique of the present system 
will be disappointed; Katz and Ten are engaged in essentially con-
servative enterprises. Both implicitly assume that criminality lurks in 
the breast of the miscreant rather than in the injustice or stupidity of 
4. P. 296. In general, Katz declines to take sides in doctrinal disputes or to declare his 
preferences among competing approaches. 
5. See, e.g., pp. 88-103, on the problems with definitions and misdescriptions, and on the 
incompatibility of statutes and the problem of identity. 
6. P. 7. Katz's use of stories is similar to Norval Morris' recent writings that use fictional 
tales in the mode of George Orwell to elucidate criminal law. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, The Brothel 
Boy, in MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 7-27 (1982); Ake Dah, 52 u. CHI. L. REV. 553 
(1985). 
7. Ten's discussion of the proper scope of criminalization is relatively thin, limiting itself 
primarily to consideration of the overlap between moral and criminal offenses, pp. 71-77, and the 
justification for negligence and strict liability offenses. Pp. 100-10. In both cases, Ten embeds 
the analysis in the theory of punishment. 
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our society or the criminal law, and that present criminal law is funda-
mentally fair. Katz tries admirably to enlighten our understanding of 
present doctrine, but almost never suggests or even considers whether 
the doctrine is worth the effort. He usually assumes that our "intu-
itions" are correct and thus need to be clarified or supported rather 
than exploded. Ten organizes and illuminates underlying theories, but 
does not consider whether the current foundations are justifiable or 
whether alternative foundations, say a Marxist theory, might be pref-
erable. Neither book confronts the seemingly intractaple conundrum 
of the social antecedents of criminal behavior or the blatant inequity 
and inefficiency of the criminal justice system. 8 Between them the 
books explore an interesting range of topics, including, among others, 
speluncean explorers, sleepwalkers, witchcraft, and the theories of 
Bentham, Mill, Hart, and Herbert Morris, but nothing is said of pov-
erty, drugs, police misconduct, or the brutal conditions in most jails 
and prisons. 
Are the foregoing observations a problem for either Katz or Ten? 
I think not. Authors are entitled to set limited agendas and should be 
judged by how successfully they meet them. One might argue that 
authorial authority cannot be justified when the topic under considera-
tion, such as criminal law, is centrally related to justice and individual 
suffering. But asking for more would require the authors to write dif-
ferent books. Pointing out moral and intellectual failures in their 
agendas, if such they be, can be profitably left to the critics. Those 
who believe that Anglo-American criminal law and justice are hope-
lessly corrupt will treat both books as implicit apologetics, but liberals 
with a less utopian, critical stance will be satisfied to engage the argu-
ments in their own terms. By the latter standard, both Katz and Ten 
succeed in advancing our understanding. 
Like many philosophers and criminal law theorists, Katz and Ten 
both have a taste for what Ten refers to as "fantastic" cases (p. 18), 
but the cases they choose, how they use them, and how they justify 
using them are markedly different. Katz's "fantastic" cases are usu-
ally real, and he provides rich detail to permit the reader to recreate 
imaginatively the criminal event as it occurred. His justification for 
routinely using "fantastic" cases, albeit real ones, is unusually scanty, 
however: "Few cases, even imaginary ones, are bizarre enough never 
to have happened before" (p. 17); "But in law, as elsewhere," he 
writes, "it is our encounter with the 'absurd' that lets us understand 
the 'normal,' by making us feel as though we saw it for the first time" 
(p. 16). By the "normal," Katz refers to traditional doctrinal conun-
drums and what might explain them. Ten, on the other hand, uses 
mostly fictional, rather abstract and sketchy hypotheticals, but he pro-
8. Ten does address the central consequentialist arguments about deterrence and 
incapacitation. 
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vides an incongruously lengthy,9 sometimes difficult, and interesting 
argument for employing fantastic cases. His justification, in brief, is 
that such cases promote honesty, depth and consistency in our moral 
thinking by forcing us to confront the full implications of our princi-
ples.10 Thus, fantastic cases help us decide what justifications for pun-
ishment we can really live with. 
Who can reasonably oppose making us feel as though we saw nor-
mality for the first time, or promoting honesty, depth and consistency 
in moral thinking? Moreover, fantastic cases can be great fun. I nev-
ertheless confess to ambivalence about fantastic cases, especially those 
that seem inconsistent with our conception of the facts of human exist-
ence. Moral thinking is about human conduct or it is about nothing at 
all: Even assuming that there are consistent fundamental principles 
from which all rules and decisions must be derived and that we must 
be consistent in our morals, I am troubled by arguments that suggest 
that a moral principle is unacceptable when it produces an unaccept-
able outcome in a situation that could not possibly exist according to 
the facts as we know them. If otherwise desirable principles produce 
consistent and coherent results in human society as we know or be-
lieve it could be, that is good enough for me. If a perfectly successful 
"frame-up" that produces more good than harm isn't really possible, 
as many believe, we need not reject solely consequential justifications 
because we worry about the horror of intentionally punishing the in-
nocent to reduce crime rates. To be useful as a guide to public policy, 
a successful argument against consequentialism or any other theory of 
justification for punishment will have to avoid recourse to impossible 
cases. 
As Ten recognizes, there is also an epistemological hitch in using 
fantastic cases as a form of controlled moral experimentation (pp. 25-
27). It is bootless to create imaginary worlds in which impossible facts 
exist but all else is the same. We can imagine such worlds, but by 
9. Pp. 18-32. This is obviously a philosophical question that exercises Ten quite indepen-
dently of its relation to crime and punishment. 
10. See especially pp. 20-21, 23, 31-32. Much of the argument rests, I believe, on controver-
sial moral theoretical (perhaps even metaethical) assumptions about, for example, the existence 
and universality of "fundamental" moral principles and their relation to "subordinate" princi-
ples. Thus, the analysis is part of a wider debate about the proper way to "do" moral philosophy, 
which probably explains why it engages Ten so strongly and why, lengthy though the discussion 
is in this book, too much is assumed for the argument to be convincing. The section seems like 
part of an ongoing complex conversation into which one has inadvertently stumbled. 
Ten inserts this justification in the context of discussing whether punishing the innocent in-
tentionally might be optimal, an oft-used hypothetical that puts intense pressure on a solely 
consequentialist justification for punishment. Unless employing such fantastic cases is supporta-
ble, it becomes more difficult to defeat the commonsensical arguments in favor of consequential-
ism. But accepting this difficulty as an argument in support of using fantastic cases begs the 
question in their favor and against consequentialism. Ten does not make this error, but he does 
argue later for a mixed theory of punishment. Consequently, he needs to justify fantastic cases in 
order to demonstrate the most unappealing features of consequentialism. 
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doing so we unjustifiably smuggle in present conditions: a world so 
different in one respect would surely be different in other crucially rel-
evant respects that we cannot imagine, but that would surely alter the 
moral landscape. As an antidote, Ten recommends that we not choose 
cases that "involve too radical a change in human nature or in the 
world in which we live" (p. 26). But then the argument shifts to par-
ticularly refractory and therefore unhelpful disputes about the exist-
ence or content of human nature or what is "too radical a change."11 
And so on. It is better to avoid such unnecessary arguments. 
As Katz vividly demonstrates, impossible fantastic cases aren't 
necessary; reality will do quite well to put pressure on our concepts 
and justifications. He bases the facts of even his most extensive fic-
tional cases - the speluncean explorers and Omeira - on real cases. 
I also agree with him that "deviant" or "absurd" cases help us define 
the boundaries of the normal and are therefore useful. Caution is still 
indicated, however. The boundary between the "normal" and the "ab-
surd" is hardly an invariant, intrinsic feature of reality. This bound-
ary is perceived under a contingent theoretical description that shifts 
in response to new cases and theories. As Katz would surely agree, 
despite his stance in Bad Acts and Guilty Minds of taking the world 
largely as he finds it, currently deviant cases can thus change bounda-
ries as well as identify them. Normality can come to seem absurd as 
well as the reverse. 12 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of actual deviant cases is that 
they make us question current justifications for pumshment and spe-
cific doctrines. For example, acting consciously but under alleged 
post-hypnotic suggestion, hardly a standard case, causes us to rethink 
what it means to be in charge of oneself. Or, as Fitzjames Stephen 
wondered in reference to The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, there 
may be no principle at all that disposes of the case, so we might just 
have to muddle along when, mercifully rarely, such cases arise. 13 For 
a final example, I can come up with no adequate theoretical and prac-
tical response to a crime committed by one of the personalities of a 
human being with genuine multiple personalities.14 In sum, fantastic 
11. Also, if human nature changes, is it "human" nature any longer, or was it "nature" to 
begin with? 
12. Katz suggests as much when he notes that current concepts in the philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science perhaps should cause us to abandon, in both law and ordinary discourse, 
the "folk psychology" that explains human conduct in terms of desires, beliefs and intentions. 
Pp. 302-04, 332, n.2. 
Also, most of Katz's (and Ten's) cases are not absurd or deviant, even though the locale and 
facts may be exotic. A mistaken but culturally explicable belief in the Sudan is abstractly 
equivalent to a mistaken but culturally explicable belief in Philadelphia, Buenos Aries, or Kuala 
Lumpur. 
13. J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 76-77 (2d ed. 
1890). 
14. Kathleen Wilkes, in an analogous conceptual context, claims that our concept of the 
person is defeated by multiple personality. K. WILKES, REAL PEOPLE: PERSONAL IDENTITY 
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actual cases emphasize and create fascinating intellectual issues, but it 
is never clear where they will lead us, and we may overestimate their 
importance because they are usually so vivid15 and we desire to estab-
lish consistent, overarching theories that explain and justify our 
practices. 
The essential lesson Katz and Ten teach, far more important than 
any individual move either makes, is the critical importance of theory. 
I believe Katz would claim that Bad Acts and Guilty Minds induc-
tively demonstrates the philosophical unity that the "problems" of 
"intentionality" and "possible worlds" bring to the field (pp. 306-07); 
Ten might claim that his book demonstrates that criminal law can 
achieve the goals of fairness and efficiency only by the application of a 
clear, subtle and textured mixed justification of punishment. 16 Never-
theless, although Katz and Ten present complementary but mutually 
exclusive theoretical worlds, the importance of theory is the implicit 
thesis of both books. 
In his famous essay, "The Hedgehog and the Fox,"17 Isaiah Berlin 
distinguishes two types of writers and thinkers by using a fragment of 
Greek poetry that portrays the fox as knowing many things and the 
hedgehog as knowing one big thing. Berlin describes the two as 
follows: 
[T]here exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate 
everything to a single central vision, one system less or more coherent or 
articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel - a single, 
universal, organizing principle in terms of which alone all that they are 
and say has significance - and, on the other side, those who pursue 
many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, 
only in some de facto way, for some psychological or physiological cause, 
related by no moral or aesthetic principle .... 18 
As should be clear by now, Katz is an instinctive theoretical fox, albeit 
with faint designs on becoming a hedgehog, and Ten is a theoretical 
hedgehog by design and probably by instinct. Let us pursue the vir-
tues and vices of these denizens of the theoretical menagerie. 
Katz is interested in everything, his mind always at exploratory 
WITHOUT THOUGHT ExPERIMENTS vii, 109-28 (1988). Needless to say, the failure to concep-
tualize the personhood of such people adequately is related to the failure adequately to concep-
tualize their criminal responsibility for the deeds of one personality. 
15. See R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF 
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 45-62 (1980). Katz is very much attracted to the type of psychological anal-
ysis exemplified by Nisbett & Ross' work. 
16. No specific page reference supports this conjecture, but his discussion following the pres-
entation of various mixed views, including his own, makes sense from this perspective. 
17. I. BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS 22 (H. Hardy & A. Kelly eds. 1979). 
18. Id. Berlin recognizes, of course, that some writers and thinkers are not easily classified, 
and that, like most such classifications, his can sometimes obscure as well as clarify. But he also 
believes, and I concur, that "like all distinctions which embody any degree of truth, it offers a 
point of view from which to look and compare, a starting-point for genuine investigation." Id. at 
23. 
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play, using philosophy and psychology as tools. He moves quickly 
from one topic to another, covering an enormous array of criminal law 
conundrums, using whatever theory or scientific findings seem most 
appropriate for the issue at hand. He is always thoughtful, often clari-
fying, sometimes provoking, and never dull or dry. But he can also be 
frustrating and can make one understand the virtues of the hedgehog. 
Consider Katz's discussion of omissions. Distinguishing a~ts from 
omissions can have crucial consequences for criminal liability, but this 
distinction is often notoriously hard to draw. Katz proves this with 
many apt fact situations, and then, using his enormously helpful un-
derstanding of counterfactual conditional analysis, he proposes the fol-
lowing test to distinguish acts from omissions: "If the defendant did 
not exist, would the harmful outcome in question still have occurred 
in the way it did" (p. 143)? Katz claims, largely rightly I believe, that 
this test clearly gets the easy cases right and that it produces equivocal 
results in cases where our intuitions are equivocal. He continues by 
demonstrating convincingly that many counterfactual conditionals are 
inherently ambiguous and thus cannot yield determinate results. At 
this point he considers the nature of omissions "settled"19 and con-
cludes the section by raising practical and theoretical objections to 
criminalizing omissions - for example, the difficulty of drafting a 
statute, the fear of driving people away from places where they might 
be called upon to help, the general uncertainty about the consequences 
of an omission, and the intrusion on autonomy that would result. In 
ten well-written pages, Katz entices with stories that explore omis-
sions, tersely describes the applicable law, and uses philosophy and 
common sense to illuminate the issue (pp. 135-45). So why am I still 
frustrated? 
Katz is so good that I want him to pursue this and every other 
topic far deeper than he does. Surely more could be said philosoph-
ically about omissions, such as their relation to notions of causation.20 
More important, however, this example illustrates the book's essential 
conservatism. Katz assumes that a good test is one that explains cur-
rent law, that most of us have the same intuitions, and, further, that 
the intuitions are correct and thus the proper template for legal accu-
19. P. 144. Katz has a somewhat unsettling general tendency to consider a matter prema-
turely settled. He often presents "solutions" to his conundrums with easy assurance, when, as he 
clearly knows, the philosophical or scientific literature he relies on is more controversial than he 
allows in the text. For example, Katz supports his discussion of why attenuation of the causal 
chain diminishes our anger toward a heinous actor with psychological theory and data that are 
quite controversial, as he recognizes by appropriate citations in the footnotes. Pp. 216-23, 326-
27, esp. nn.8, 12. Also, the use of this literature leaves unclarified whether Katz believes that the 
psychological "facts" cited are an invariant characteristic of people or are highly contingent and 
thus can be altered if they predispose us to morally objectionable attitudes. 
20. Indeed, Katz has a fine chapter on causation, pp. 210-51, whose insights could have been 
profitably related to the discussion of omissions. 
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racy. But these assumptions inevitably create a demand for more 
analysis. 
Katz explains, probably correctly but too briefly, that current law 
is based on respect for autonomy: The person who fails to prevent 
harm simply fails to give away something he owns, whereas the person 
who brings about harm takes away something owned by someone else 
(p. 145). One wonders, however: Is he describing or prescribing? He 
doesn't indicate, but in either case there is more to say. As Katz 
knows well and uses to good advantage, language is sufficiently ambig-
uous to permit many plausible descriptions of the "same" event, each 
having very different consequences. Is an economic metaphor for au-
tonomy in the context of preventing harms defensible? What does the 
omitter "own"? His right to be left alone? His right to let easily pre-
ventable but horrible harms occur? Criminal prohibitions also inter-
fere with negative liberty, so is the difference simply a matter of the 
degree of liberty intrusion?21 Katz is right that notions of autonomy 
underwrite the different treatment of acts and omissions, but the con-
cept of autonomy demands unpacking to determine if it is defensible 
and consistent with Katz's formula for distinguishing acts and omis-
sions and with other doctrines in the criminal law. How does the anal-
ysis of omissions cohere with the analysis of conduct under post-
hypnotic suggestion, also an "act" problem, according to Katz? To 
unpack autonomy and to determine if its use in the context of omis-
sions coheres with its use elsewhere in the criminal law, one would 
need a hedgehog's interloeking theory of action, autonomy and the 
purposes of the criminal law. 
Finally, is current law morally defensible? Should the act/omis-
sion distinction be so broadly drawn? Why should our intuitions be 
the template? If law and moral intuitions are in reflective equilibrium, 
won't changes in the law lead to changes in our intuitions? What is 
the criminal law good for? If we reflect on the moral implications of 
the current distinction between acts and omissions, would we change 
the law? Would it be any harder to draft a workable statute for 
criminalizing omissions than, for example, to draft statutes prohibiting 
negligent conduct? 
Virtually all of Katz's discrete analyses have the many virtues I 
have described, although most do not dig really deeply into the litera-
tures or consider his conundrums in light of the general justifying aims 
of the criminal law. But given the complexities of the philosophical 
and psychological materials Katz employs, the book would lose much 
of its sparkling narrative force if he presented either much lengthier 
21. For example, prohibitions on actions arguably affect liberty in only a finite number of 
cases, whereas duties to act could be virtually unlimited depending on the luck of one's exper-
iences. Some hapless people may simply keep running into abandoned infants drowning in tiny 
puddles in summer or into situations in which their neighbors are assaulted in a shared 
courtyard. 
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philosophical analyses or cautiously qualified accounts of his "tenta-
tive" solution to each conundrum. 22 He is an exquisite fox, who dem-
onstrates repeatedly and convincingly the indispensability of theory 
for clarifying individual doctrines. Thus particular disagreements23 or 
even the rare errors24 do not undermine a general thesis or the overall 
22. I think Katz has made an entirely reasonable choice about how to present the material, 
but it could somewhat mislead the nonspecialist reader. On the other hand, if he were more 
"balanced," the book would be much longer and would doubtlessly r'!pel the nonspecialist. 
23. For example, I disagree with his analysis of the appropriate response to action in accord 
with hypnotic suggestion. Katz believes that a person acting under post-hypnotic suggestion 
should be excused because his or her acts reflect the will of the hypnotist rather than his or her 
own will. P. 134. Because a person acting under post-hypnotic suggestion meets Katz's earlier 
test for action, pp. 127-28, I am not sure ifhe is being inconsistent. In any case, my disagreement 
follows from a theory of responsibility that would treat a hypnotic suggestion simply as a cause 
like many others that a person may or may not be aware of, but which motivates an actor on the 
spur of the moment. Examples of such other causes would be a ravishingly persuasive argument, 
an effective emotional appeal, or any unrecognized situational variable that causes a strong de-
sire/belief set. See D. DENNEIT, ELBOW ROOM: THE v ARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH 
WANTING 63-65 (1984). 
For another example, which I cannot resist because Katz has entrapped me into discussing it, 
consider his discussion of whether entrapment excuses. Katz claims that entrapment raises "act" 
problems: the entrapped defendant is being punished for his disposition to crime. Here is his 
justification for this claim. First, he alleges that "criminal" dispositions "reside within all of us." 
P. 160. (Katz footnotes this assertion but it needs no footnote because no one knows this as a 
matter of empirical "fact": it is a matter of opinion about which Katz is as expert as anyone 
else.) He continues by asking how we should respond to the lifeboat case if it had b~n contrived 
as a police set-up and one of the crew had been stopped just prior to killing another crew 
member: 
If the situation were for real, he might be guilty of attempted murder. But it isn't. Is he still 
guilty? I don't think so. Everyone, I think, is entitled to his turn at the wheel of fortune. If 
he is lucky, he will never be faced with a situation in which his criminal disposition surfaces. 
Entrapment is a way of rigging the wheel. 
Pp. 160-61. Thus, Katz's argument is that but for the bad luck of being the object of a law 
enforcement "sting," the defendant's criminal disposition would never have surfaced and we are 
really condemning him for his disposition. 
But why is luck the issue, and in what way, morally relevant to the actor's responsibility, is 
the entrapment situation unreal? How would Katz respond to an impoverished slum dweller 
who claims that if he had been luckier and our society had been more just, he would not have 
been exposed to an exceptionally criminogenic environment. But for being born into that envi-, 
ronment, he claims, his criminal disposition would not have surfaced either: the "wheel was 
rigged" against him in a way he was particularly helpless to avoid. Should the difference in the 
cause of the "surfacing" of the disposition - the intentional conduct of the police versus the 
contingency of ancestry and the injustice of society - support a difference in guilt? Perhaps so 
or perhaps not, but not because of considerations raised by the act doctrine. 
According to the minority, "objective" rule, the difficulty with entrapment is not an act prob-
lem. Rather, we simply cannot stomach certain types of conduct from public (or, more rarely, 
private) agents and we excuse the "entrapped" defendant to deter such conduct. Even the majorr 
ity, "subjective" entrapment rule, which does focus on the defendant's disposition, only accepts 
the defense if the "entrapper" plants the criminal disposition in a person otherWise lacking such 
tendencies. Thus the majority rule denies Katz's first premise about universal criminal disposi-
tions. 
Finally, Katz's use of a concept like a criminal dispositiO!J. coheres uncoffirortably with his 
seeming preference for situational explanations of behavior and his skepticism about "folk pSy~ 
chology." Also, is a disposition "criminal" if its behavioral outcome is not a crime? 
But enough of such quibbles. 
24. For example, Katz appears' to believe that all excuses, including insanity, are baSed on 
"extraordinary pressures" and are thus all variants of "necessity and duress." P. 81. But what 
do "extraordinary" and "pressure" mean? A delusional person may act entirely coolly and with-
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success of the book. Nevertheless, intense fox-hunting makes me 
yearn for the solidity and depth of a hedgehog. As one applauds 
Katz's virtuosity, one simultaneously generates the inevitable 
hedgehog questions he never addresses. I don't know Leo Katz, but I 
know he would have thoughtful, useful and theoretical responses to 
every question I could raise. 
By expressing my frustration and raising the dread specter of 
unasked questions, however, am I not violating my injunction to take 
a book on its own terms? Not at all. I began this review by asking 
how one should write and think about criminal law. Bad Acts and 
Guilty Minds is a successful example of one approach. I am simply 
indicating that when foxes scamper through the criminal law, no mat-
ter how good they are - and Katz is very good, indeed - they will 
inevitably produce a limited account. As we shall see next, the same 
result occurs when hedgehogs root about in the same field. 
Whereas Katz relies on theories to illuminate specific doctrines, 
Ten relies on theories to justify the entire criminal law. As noted, he 
describes and analyzes the utilitarian and retributive justifications for 
criminal prohibitions and punishments. The book aims to be a "pri-
mer," but it is surely for very sophisticated neophytes and can be prof-
itably read by specialists, who will find new arguments and 
considerations in the wealth of material Ten economically presents.25 
Ten properly avoids the impulse to ground retributive and utilitarian 
theories metaethically, contenting himself with making the most sense 
of each without reaching for a metaphysical purchase. Because Crime, 
Guilt, and Punishment is a didactic primer, Ten reigns in any impulse 
to permit his own thesis to dominate, but the necessity of using general 
justifying and distributive theories and the desirability of a mixed the-
ory are the clear messages. 26 
out any more sense of "pressure" than a person who acts on the basis of nondelusional beliefs. 
Infancy is an excuse, but infants do not act because they are "pressured." Finally, a defendant 
victimized by a hard choice that she did not create will succeed with a duress defense even if 
there was no sense of pressure. Now Katz may mean by "pressure" nothing more than a hard 
choice that leaves a person with no reasonable alternative, and if so, he is right about duress. But 
this still will not do for insanity or infancy. A delusional defendant's choice to act on his deluded 
beliefs is no harder in the relevant sense than the choice of the nondeluded defendant. Perhaps, 
however, extraordinary pressure is synonymous with abnormal causation, but if so Katz needs 
far more analysis of what abnormal causation is and why it excuses. Katz lacks in general a 
theory of responsibility. 
I suggest that irrationality, not pressure, is what explains the excuses of insanity and infancy, 
and the partial excuse of provocation. See Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense 
Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 782-84, 787-92 (1985); Morse, Undiminished Confusion 
in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 1, 20-23, 29-30 (1984); see generally Morse, 
Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 
1985: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 35 (G. Melton ed. 1986). 
25. Ten's sophistication and complexity remind me of other high-level "primers" that are 
useful for more sophisticated readers. See, e.g., G. HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1977). 
26. The advantages and defects of various justifying theories are well-trodden ground and, 
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If one wishes to build a coherent, consistent and just criminal law 
from the ground up, Ten's discussion identifies the right foundational 
level. He asks what the criminal law is good for: When is the state 
justified in prohibiting and punishing conduct? It is unthinkable that 
one could fully consider any doctrinal question or any institutional 
arrangement without attending to the underlying theory. Notions of 
just deserts, crime prevention, social cohesion and the like are indis-
pensable to help us to decide whether and how to respond to the life-
boat cannibals, to those who kill intentionally in response to mistaken 
beliefs, to those who act under post-hypnotic suggestion, to those who 
are able to prevent harm but do not, to the problem of measuring 
causal "chains," to the problem of moral luck, to group criminality, 
and to all the rest of the doctrinal questions Katz so ably addresses. 
But Ten is no Reverend Casaubon, the character in Eliot's Mid-
dlemarch who aimed to recover the key to all mythologies in a tradi-
tion originally revealed. 27 He presents his own mixed justification 
with admirable restraint, and rightly so. For who would expect, in 
light of the history of such theories and the counterarguments that 
Ten makes so successfully, that solid objections would not arise? Any 
grand theory proposed to solve all the doctrinal conundrums individu-
ally, to make all the doctrine cohere together, and to convince us of 
the justice of the whole system is unlikely to survive challenge. Never-
theless, we simply cannot talk encompassingly about criminal law 
without general justifying theories. 
Even if we all agreed that one of the contending general theories 
was the right one, however, our problems are still not solved because 
translating general theories into specific rules is difficult. Suppose you 
are a utilitarian: Should criminal behavior in response to provocation 
be punished more or less harshly than unprovoked behavior? As Ten 
clearly demonstrates, a reasonable argument can be offered for either 
position and neither will be entirely convincing (pp. 146-50) (unless, I 
imagine, we are all hooked up to undeniably accurate utilometers). 
Assuming no constitutional constraints, should abortions be prohib-
ited or capital punishment instituted? Pick your preferred general the-
ory: Is the answer determinate? General theories are necessary but 
founder when we move to the level of "details." The historical record 
is littered with intellectually elegant and rigorous theories, large and 
small, that just could not be "worked out" in practice. 
because I have done so elsewhere, I will reign in my impulse to quibble with Ten and to advance 
my preferred view. See, e.g., Morse, Justice, Mercy and Craziness (Book Review), 36 STAN. L. 
REv. 1485, 1493-509 (1984) (reviewing N. MORRIS, supra note 6). The thrust of my objection to 
Ten, Hart, Morris, and other mixed theorists is that I simply do not find useful the distinction 
between the general justifying aim and the alleged distributive aim of criminal punishment. 
Moreover, mixed theories will, I believe, produce punishments for people convicted of the same 
offense that are unjustifiably unequal. 
27. G. ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH 25 (Modern Library ed. 1984). 
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The appropriate response to the indeterminacy of these theories is 
to understand that general theories must always be in "reflective equi-
librium" with their multifarious implications and with our concep-
tions of the facts about ourselves and our society. Thus, if one is 
interested in public policy, one finally wishes for specific cases and 
doctrines with which to test and refine the general theories and vice 
versa. After creating the grand house of theory, one also wants furni-
ture one can live with. 
Ten cannot be faulted for scant "practical" details. His self-con-
scious task in this relatively short book is primarily the hedgehog's -
analyzing grand theories. Moreover, he does include many details, 
although almost none at the specific level Katz addresses (and none in 
common). Ten's limited approach is a bit less frustrating than Katz's 
because one expects less from a primer, but it is frustrating neverthe-
less. Again, I am not violating my injunction to take a book on its 
own terms. I am simply indicating that even a fine hedgehog's ac-
count of the criminal law - and Ten is very good, indeed - must 
inevitably be as limited as the fox's. 
III 
So, how should one think and write about criminal law? The ideal 
thinker and writer is both a hedgehog and a fox, combining the best of 
general justifying theories with the best of microtheories about specific 
doctrines, practices, and institutions to produce a consistent, coherent 
and just whole. Needless to say, few have the talent, ambition or cour-
age to complete such a daunting project successfully.28 If either Katz 
or Ten had considered the questions the other explicitly and implicitly 
raises, both would have written very different, much longer, and by no 
means more surely successful books. 
If one desires a sophisticated, interesting theoretical view of doc-
trines, one can do no better than to read Katz; and if one desires a 
sophisticated, interesting brief review of general theory that also 
makes original arguments, one can do no better than to read Ten. But 
if one desires an overview of substantive criminal law, one should read 
them both. The order in which they should be read, of course, de-
pends on whether the reader is a hedgehog or a fox. 
28. George Fletcher's RE.THINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978) is the most noteworthy recent 
attempt, and a useful point of comparison with both Katz and Ten. 
